The Gatekeepers

Interests standing in the way of PRT implementation

D.S. Gow, MPA (if e-mailing remove NOSPAM)




Innovation faces bigger hurdles

Jan. 4, 2002. The glass ceiling which Personal Rapid Transit can't seem to break through is one which conventional forms of transit did not have to face. 19th century horse-drawn conveyances were basically no competition for the new innovations: trains, streetcars and, later, the automobile. Combine the technological advantage with the friendlier regulatory environment of the era and it was relatively easier (than today) for private businesses to launch a new mode of transport.

The 'experts' don't want you to know about PRT

Today there is essentially no free market for transit technology, for those with a stake in maintaining today's status quo are the ones who control entry into that market--

  • Transit Agencies whose only experience is in planning and operating conventional systems.
  • Transit Manufacturers who make and sell conventional systems and who spend a lot of money lobbying transit agencies to continue buying them.
  • Transit Consultants who pass judgement on feasibility of new technology, whose only experience is in planning and engineering for conventional systems, and whose interest is in perpetuating demand for their services.
    •

    This "Agency-Industry Cartel" stands in the way of any new transit technology, whether PRT, Dual Mode, or other. And the most common instrument the Cartel uses to perpetuate its control is the farce known as the alternative transit technology assessment, or ATTA.

    Skewing the Alternative Technology Assessment

    On its face the ATTA is a good thing, any responsible public agency wants to make sure everyone knows they are up to date and planning to stay that way. But in reality the ATTA process seems designed not to identify promising new technology, but to eliminate it from consideration by setting evaluative criteria that can only be met by conventional technology. In the case of PRT--

  • Capacity. Trains might seat anywhere from 75 to 150 passengers per run; PRT only seats 3 or 4 per vehicle. ATTAs conclude PRT couldn't possibly have capacity equal to trains--despite PRT being able to serve thousands of riders per hour because each vehicle in the fleet can be reused many times per hour. So, a 5000-vehicle PRT fleet where each pod serves three fares per hour is carrying 15,000 fares per hour, already 30-40% of what a train system hopes to carry in an entire day. Learn more
  • Capacity. Trains move people back and forth along a corridor, so ATTAs demand that PRT be able to move as many people per direction in an hour (PPHPD) as trains-- despite PRT being network-based, not line-haul. Learn more
  • Common Design. A characteristic of Light Rail is that, for the most part, they use the same gauge of track and agencies can choose from a variety of makes and models of train cars. This is Good, says the Cartel, because choice = competition = The Best Price (as though $1-2 million per car is a bargain), and also the agency won't be "stuck" if the maker goes out of business. Therefore, the ATTA process demands that PRT also have multiple manufacturers whose vehicles will run on each other's guideways-- clearly unrealistic for a nascent transit system. The truth is that trains are made by only a relative few companies; while not a monopolistic situation, it is oligopolistic-- the effect of competition on price can hardly be significant.
  • Cost. At prices that start at $50-75 million per mile, trains are expensive and transit agencies must scrap for every dollar to build just a few miles of rail, and then huge subsidies are required to operate it. The ATTA eliminates PRT on the assumption that a large PRT network must necessarily be prohibitively expensive or present too great an up-front initial investment (as though $1 billion-plus for a starter light rail or monorail spine is not a large initial investment). What they miss is that lower unit cost plus accessibility mean higher ridership, so PRT can pay for itself, no matter the network's size-- big OR small. Learn more
  • Cost. Cost estimates submitted by PRT companies are usually ignored in favor of counter-estimates drawn up by the consultants which are always higher. The basis of these counter-estimates tend to be mysterious or based upon outdated PRT development projects like Raytheon's (1990s) or Boeing's (1970s).

    • But the most insidious criterion is "PRT is Unproven," as though a new technology can spring into existence fully-formed, debugged and tested by time. The circular reasoning is firm: "PRT is unproven, therefore it cannot be selected; because it cannot be selected, PRT can never become proven." Thus the Unproven criterion is used to disallow PRT on every aspect of its technology, service characteristics, and cost estimates no matter how simple the design, no matter how tested the individual components, no matter how solid the cost estimates. Interestingly, coinciding with recent and current PRT successes (1995-98 testing of Raytheon's PRT2000, Taxi2000 winning design competitions in Cincinnati and SeaTac WA, successful ULTra testing in 2002) a new corollary of Unproven has arisen: "PRT is Unproven in actual revenue service operation"-- an even more impossible prerequisite. Learn more

    Is it any wonder the gatekeepers won't lift a finger to help any truly new transit technology? The ATTA is the Agency-Industry Cartel's most powerful weapon-- purportedly a process for identifying new technologies, yet using that newness as an excuse to deny them even a fair test.

    The author has a degree in Policy Analysis from the University of Washington Graduate School of Public Affairs (now known as The Evans School).

    Get on board! Personal Rapid Transit

    References

  • PB Farradyne, Trans-Lake Washington Project: High Capacity Transit Technology Options. PDF document, annotated with reviewer's comments (posted in Yahoo Groups, painless registration required to view)
  • LTK Engineering Services, Sound Transit Link light rail project: Transit Technology Review.
  • Parsons Transportation Group, Cedar Avenue Corridor Transitway Study: Technology Assessment
  • Charles S. Tappan, Why the Central Area Loop Study Committee Failed to Adopt PRT
  • Elevated Transportation Co., Technology Alternatives Narrowing Paper
  • Colorado Dept. of Transportation, Interstate 25 Corridor Mode Feasibility Alternatives Analysis, Ch. 3, Development of Initial Alternatives. Uses 25 year-old Morgantown GRT costs to disqualify PRT as "too costly".
  • City of Austin/Capital Metro, Rapid Transit Project Draft Milestone 2 Executive Summary: Report On Types Of Urban Transit Vehicles
  • Carter & Burgess Inc., Fort Worth Alternatives Analysis & Environmental Assessment: Technology Assessment
  • Utah Metro, transit Classroom
  • Wikipedia, Personal Rapid Transit entry.